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Since the end of World War II, stability in Northeast Asia has been a key goal of 
the United States.  Maintaining a balance of power in this maritime theater has proven 
important for regional stability and global economic growth.  The modernization of the 
South Korean Navy and its changing maritime strategy will have ramifications for the 
U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) relationship in the future.  In the current world situation, 
changing regional threats will require new approaches to maintaining future stability.  
The United States and South Korea must work together toward achieving stronger 
bilateral and multilateral relationships with other principal actors in the region to achieve 
this goal.  The purpose of this thesis is to review the changing strategies of the United 
States and South Korean Navies in Northeast Asia and to examine the ramifications 
should a more cooperative maritime alliance structure be utilized in the future. It is 
relevant because the United States has played a vital role in the security of the Korean 
peninsula since the end of World War II, and because decisions made by South Korea 
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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The United States historically has had a strong maritime tradition in the Asia-
Pacific.  Developing in stages since the founding of the United States, the relationship 
between the United States and countries in the Asia-Pacific region has seen periods of 
territorial expansion, conflict, containment, and engagement.  The U.S. Navy Pacific 
Fleet’s involvement in the region has focused on maintaining stability through a balance 
of power to foster economic growth.   
The immense size and cultural differences within the Asia-Pacific region require 
U.S. interests to cover a wide spectrum of issues.  Supporting policies in Northeast Asia 
which ensure security, honor commitments between allies and friends, and contribute to 
economic growth are the focus of U.S. national interests in the region. 
The U.S. strategy supports these interests by assuring allies and friends, 
dissuading adversaries, deterring aggression and coercion, and when necessary decisively 
defeating opponents.  The strategy of engagement provides the United States the ability 
to create a foundation of security that allows for economic growth.  The United States 
counters regional threats through reinforcing U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan, 
maintaining a U.S. forward based presence, and developing multilateral regional 
institutions. 
The peoples that inhabited the Korean peninsula have historically had mixed 
maritime successes.  While vulnerable to water invasion from the three sides of the 
peninsula, the early inhabitants of Korea focused their fortifications more heavily on the 
threat of land invaders from the north.  Admiral Yi Sun-shin, the great figure of Korean 
naval history, repelled the Japanese invasions of the peninsula in the 1590’s due to his 
invention of the first iron clad warship.   
Korea was able to remain isolated from the outside world until the late nineteenth 
century.  Foreign intervention and armed conflict resulted in Japanese dominance over 
the peninsula which lasted from its annexation in 1910 through the end of WWII.  
Following World War II, the fight to gain influence and power over the Korean peninsula 
erupted in the Korean War.  Since the signing of the armistice in Korea, the ROK Navy 
  x
has focused primarily on coastal defense capabilities.  The ROK Navy has predominantly 
designed its naval force structure to complement the ROK Army and U.S. forces in 
defense against the North.  Naval clashes in the Yellow (West) Sea in June 1999, and 
again in June 2002 demonstrate the necessity for this capability.  As Korea looks towards 
the future, this strategy is changing as it redirects its outlook to a more regional security 
focus. 
South Korea, as a modern member of the Northeast Asian community, finds itself 
in a maritime environment that is rapidly changing.  Shifting beyond a coastal to a 
regional mindset, South Korean interests are changing from an inward defensive focus to 
one which incorporates global economic opportunities.  South Korea’s changing interests 
and the recognition of the importance of sea lines of communication for trade and 
security purposes have increased the need for naval capabilities.   
South Korea is developing its role as a regional power.  The ROK Navy is rapidly 
expanding and becoming increasingly sophisticated.  Through modernization programs 
focusing on its destroyer and submarine fleets, South Korea is becoming a well-balanced, 
blue water naval force. 
Several common themes emerge when assessing U.S. regional concerns and 
opportunities for cooperation in Northeast Asia.  U.S.-ROK concerns focus on ensuring 
stability in the region for the indefinite future.  This stability has historically been a 
product of successful bilateral security alliances with Japan and South Korea.  As the 
unification process on the Korean peninsula progresses it is likely that the maritime 
component of the U.S.-ROK alliance will play a greater role.   
Through a naval cooperative security framework, the United States can maintain 
its presence and strengthen its ties with its current allies and friends in the region.  Each 
country in Northeast Asia could benefit from this arrangement.  As the DPRK continues 
to reform its economy and open itself to the international community, its role in a 
cooperative security organization will ease tensions in the area.  Two significant concerns 
between the ROK and Japan center on Japanese interpretations of history and the effect a 
strong unified Korean economy could have on a troubled Japanese economy.  Previous 
  xi
joint humanitarian maritime operations are a starting point for developing a cooperative 
security framework.   
Chinese and Russian common economic and military interests affect all of the 
regional powers in Northeast Asia.  It is important to plan for the eventual inclusion of 
China and Russia in a cooperative security framework.  A security agreement working to 
prevent conflict versus one that prepares for conflict would benefit all of the actors in the 





























I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW  
Since the end of World War II, stability in Northeast Asia has been a key goal of 
the United States.  Maintaining a balance of power in this maritime theater has proven 
important for regional stability and global economic growth.  The U.S. Pacific Fleet, 
working in cooperation with allies and friends in the region, has played a significant role 
in achieving these goals. 
The modernization of the South Korean navy and its changing maritime strategy 
will have ramifications for the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) relationship in the future.  
In the current world situation, changing regional threats will require new approaches to 
maintaining future stability.  The United States and South Korea must work together 
toward achieving stronger bilateral and multilateral relationships with other principal 
actors in the region to achieve this goal.   
The purpose of this thesis is to review the changing strategies of the United States 
and South Korean Navies in Northeast Asia and to examine the ramifications should a 
more cooperative maritime alliance structure be utilized in the future. The thesis is 
relevant because the United States has played a vital role in the security of the Korean 
peninsula since the end of World War II and because decisions made by South Korea 
regarding security matters affect the United States and its interests in the region. 
While it is important to interpret history in order to predict the future, this thesis 
will attempt to look forward, rather than back.  The intent is to analyze and clarify the 
patterns for the future instead of merely reporting the past.  The specific objective is to 
provide answers to these primary questions: 
• How will South Korea’s naval modernization program and changing naval 
strategy affect the U.S. strategy and interests in Northeast Asia? 
• How has the U.S.-ROK alliance changed over time from a maritime 
perspective, and how will the U.S.-ROK alliance be affected by 
impending changes? 
• How will the changes in U.S.-ROK strategy affect regional security? 
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The overarching hypothesis with regard to this set of questions is that to ensure 
continued stability in Northeast Asia, the United States and the ROK must embrace a 
cooperative relationship with other actors in the region.  Both countries must work 
toward stronger bilateral and multilateral relationships to prevent a disruption of the 
balance of power in the region. 
B. STRUCTURE OF THESIS  
Chapters II and III examine the maritime history of the United States and the 
Republic of Korea in a chronological context.  Maritime interests and strategic policies 
are studied and several themes emerge.  Chapter IV expands on these themes and 
explores their implications on U.S. and ROK future relations with other countries in 
Northeast Asia. 
Chapter II examines the evolution of U.S. strategic interests in Northeast Asia and 
reviews the current U.S. strategy.  It reviews the U.S. role as a historically strong 
maritime power and as a maritime leader in the Asia-Pacific region.  In addition, the 
growing U.S. strategic interests in Northeast Asia are examined.  The current U.S. 
strategy in Northeast Asia, of engagement and countering regional threats, is assessed. 
Chapter III reviews South Korea’s maritime strategy, looking at the past, present, 
and future.  It reviews the history of South Korea’s maritime role in Northeast Asia and 
its current strategic interests, and it details the Republic of Korea’s current strategy as 
well as its force structure.  The latter section examines the short term and long term goals 
according to the ROK’s most recent white paper.  The final segment also examines how 
this strategy is accomplished through its current policies.  
Chapter IV explores the implications for the United States.  It begins by assessing 
what changes have occurred between the United States and South Korea and then 
estimates what changes may occur in the future.  Special attention is paid to U.S. 
priorities in the region and how South Korean maritime plans may affect those priorities.  
In the following sections, this chapter looks at areas of concern and opportunities for 
cooperation with other Northeast Asian countries, including North Korea, Japan, China, 
and Russia. 
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Chapter V provides a conclusion.  In a summary format, it reviews the status of 
American and South Korean maritime strategies in Northeast Asia.  It offers future 
scenarios of  the possibilities that may lay ahead and assesses courses of action that 




























II. THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC 
INTERESTS IN NORTHEAST ASIA AND CURRENT 
STRATEGY 
A. MARITIME HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The history of the United States and its involvement in the Asia-Pacific region 
developed in multiple stages since the American colonies were in their infancy.  
Burgeoning trade opportunities with Pacific Rim countries and westward expansion were 
significant motivators for expanding the American role in the area.  The U.S. “obsession 
with China’s apparent opportunities led to the acquisition of Alaska, Hawaii, and the 
Philippines, a big navy, the Open Door policy, the construction of the Panama Canal, and 
a dangerous antagonism to Japan’s own imperial dreams.”1 
Merchants, trappers, and fisherman were all lured by the vast economic 
opportunities the Pacific region offered.  U.S. foreign relations in the 1850s were 
centered on the spice trade, the impact of the British role in the Opium War, and the 
resulting unequal treaties that opened the door to China.  Whalers and seafaring 
merchants inevitably called on the United States Navy to protect their regional interests. 
The U.S. naval presence in the Pacific theater, since the early 1800s, provided the 
foundation of security that allowed for commerce to prosper in the region.  Clearly, “the 
United States is a maritime nation.  As such, our nation’s success and its maritime 
security always have been inextricably linked.”2  Maintaining stability in the region and 
ensuring the security of trade has been in the best interests of all the actors involved.   
American expansion pushed westward from the newly independent colonies 
rapidly towards the Pacific.  The U.S. claim to the Pacific Northwest began in 1792, 
when Boston mariner, Robert Gray reached the Columbia River inlet.3  Later in 1803, 
                                                 
1 Arthur Power Dudden, The American Pacific: From the Old China Trade to the Present (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press 1992), viii. 
2 Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Maritime Challenges, 1997 (Washington, 
DC: GPO 1997), i. 
3 Han W. Hannau, USA (Springfield, MA: G. and C. Merriam Company 1972), 19. 
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during the Jefferson Administration, the purchase of the Louisiana Territory doubled the 
size of the United States.   
The peace which followed the War of 1812, was accompanied by further 
territorial expansion.  As settlers moved into Mexican held territories in the Southwest, 
colliding interests foreshadowed a conflict.  The war with Mexico beginning in 1846, 
ended in a U.S. victory which was rewarded with the land that makes up parts of present 
day California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico.   
During the 1840s, Pacific Northwest development also increased, as settlers 
headed out along the Oregon Trial from Independence, Missouri to the mouth of the 
Columbia River.  The Californian gold rush of 1849 brought many Americans to the 
west.  Manifest destiny was running its course, and by 1850 California was admitted as 
the thirty-first state.  The United States had become bi-coastal and its future outlook was 
directed towards the Pacific.   
During the initial stages of American involvement in the Pacific Rim, the history 
of U.S. naval personnel serving as explorers and ambassadors is important to note.  U.S. 
Navy Commodore Matthew Perry opened Japan with the signing of the Treaty of 
Kanagawa in 1854.  The treaty outlined procedures which provided protection for U.S. 
sailors seeking refuge and opened coal and provisioning ports in Shimoda and Hakodate.4   
The next significant stage of development in the relationship between the United 
States and the Asia-Pacific was the purchase of Alaska in 1867.  Russia’s exchange of the 
territory for $7.2 million in gold from the United States was based on four main 
assumptions.  First was Russian recognition of the United States’ manifest destiny 
outlook.  Russians feared the eventual loss of the land and preferred to benefit from the 
sale to avoid the possibility of its loss in the future.  Second was the need for money in 
the Russian national treasury.  The Crimean War against Britain and France and the 
railroad projects in which Russia was involved were extremely expensive.  The third 
assumption was that following the sale, the United States would befriend Russia against 
Britain and support Russian expansion in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.  The final 
                                                 
4 Dudden, 19. 
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consideration was that by eliminating the burden of the unprofitable territory, Russia 
could more easily focus on its interests in Central and Northeast Asia.5  Russia’s 
conclusions proved to be exceedingly off the mark.  The discovery of gold and various 
other precious metals before the end of the nineteenth century and the discovery of oil in 
the mid twentieth century, not to mention the strategic importance of the state during the 
Cold War, all made Alaska essential to the United States and its interests in the Asia-
Pacific. 
Territorial expansion continued in the later half of the nineteenth century and the 
U.S. presence in the Pacific extended to include Hawaii and the Philippines.  U.S. Navy 
Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan’s strategic naval outlook, made most famous in his 
book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, heavily swayed U.S. desires to acquire 
island territory in the Pacific for naval purposes.  Mahan explained, that to control the 
seas, “it is imperative to take possession of such maritime positions as contribute to 
secure command.”6  In Hawaii, interests ranged from the American missionary presence 
to the harbor facilities that Honolulu offered.  Economic opportunities in sugar and 
pineapple markets as well as Hawaii’s key strategic position easily persuaded the United 
States to maintain its presence on the islands.  For political and military purposes, the 
United States saw opportunities in Hawaii.  U.S. leadership believed, “annexation would 
result in political [and economic] stability.”7   
In the Philippines, U.S. interests first focused on missionary and imperialism 
activities.  Eventually, these interests focused on the military and economic advantages 
the islands offered.  The acquisition of the Philippines stemmed from the unexpected 
outcome of the Spanish-American War.  In the end, “the war with Spain annihilated the 
arguments against imperialism and brought the United States into the world of colonies, 
oversea markets, and total freedom of the seas.”8 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 22. 
6 Allan Westcott, ed., Mahan On Naval Warfare; Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred 
T. Mahan (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company 1943), 286. 
7 Ralph S. Kuykendall and A. Grove Day, Hawaii: A History, From Polynesian Kingdom to American 
State (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1961), 175. 
8 Claude A. Buss, “Lessons of History,” Pacific Security (Monterey, CA: U.S. Naval Post Graduate 
School 1998). 
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U.S. interests in Japan have seen multiple stages of development as well.  
Diplomatic relations with modern Japan began with the initial contact by Commodore 
Matthew Perry and resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Kanagawa.  As Japan 
modernized and its sphere of influence grew in the Asia-Pacific, Japanese and U.S. 
interests began to conflict.  During this period, Washington utilized several diplomatic 
efforts to try to curb Japanese growth.   
The Conference on the Limitation of Armament which took place in Washington, 
D.C. from November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922, resulted in a naval treaty between the 
United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan.  The treaty was an effort to 
control the naval buildup in the Pacific following World War I.  The agreement formally 
limited several aspects of naval force, including size and number of ships and type of 
armaments.  This conference had a significant impact on powers worldwide, but most 
important for the Asia-Pacific was the impact on Japanese and the United States’ naval 
forces in the Pacific.  The focus for the treaty in the Pacific was to limit the “new order of 
sea power which had been developing since the initiation of the modern American and 
Japanese fleets.”9 
The effect the limitations had on Japan and other regional powers’ naval strategy 
was immense.  Designed and intended to limit naval capabilities, the treaty actually 
produced the opposite result.  Japanese regional goals and nationalist sentiment 
eventually led to the development of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.  The 
consequence was that “by the 1930s the Japanese not only repudiated the agreement that 
had restricted their naval deployments, but they sought to exclude the Western powers all 
together from the region.”10 
Diplomatic measures such as the Washington Naval Conference and the economic 
embargo the United States levied against Japan limited the options for the Japanese.  
Facing limited diplomatic alternatives and believing that the United States would not 
retaliate, the Japanese aggressively attacked the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.  They 
                                                 
9 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and 
Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 1977), 245. 
10 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (New York, NY: 
Routledge 1996), 2. 
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quickly learned that they had “grievously underestimated the catastrophic nature of the 
war they would have to fight after their opening attack.”11  It would take four years and 
the explosion of two atomic bombs before the war in the Pacific would come to a 
conclusion. 
Following World War II, many countries in the region gained forms of 
independence and a period of struggle for a balance of power ensued.  Territory 
throughout the Pacific that had been affected by the Japanese--for example, the 
occupation of the Philippines and the annexation of the Korean Peninsula--was freed 
from Japanese aggression.  These newly liberated areas were heavily influenced by the 
post-war events in Europe between the rising superpowers.  The United States and the 
Soviet Union quickly moved to establish areas of influence.  In retrospect, “the evolution 
of the region therefore may be seen as beginning with great power arrangements to 
accommodate the distribution of power within the Asia-Pacific to the global balance of 
power.”12 
The Cold War that developed positioned the United States against the Soviet 
Union in a global struggle.  Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s statement 
that “an iron curtain has descended across the [European] continent” foreshadowed 
events in East Asia.13  The United States’ policy of containment and the line marking 
vital interests in Asia drawn by Secretary of State Dean Acheson extended from the 
Aleutian Islands off Alaska down to Japan and Okinawa and then south to the 
Philippines.  South Korea and the island of Taiwan were outside of this defensive 
perimeter.   
This demarcation, combined with the significant reduction in U.S. forces from the 
Korean peninsula six months earlier, undoubtedly affected the decision by North Korea’s 
leader Kim Il Sung to invade South Korea.  In an attempt to unify the peninsula, in June 
1950, the North invaded the South over the 38th parallel.   
                                                 
11 Dudden, 167. 
12 Yahuda, 3. 
13 Dudden, 192.  
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Following the invasion, under United Nations (UN) authority, the United States 
defended South Korea in a limited war.  UN forces led by the United States fought 
against the North Koreans who were supported by China and the Soviet Union.  The 
fighting ended in 1953 after lengthy negotiations that did not end the war, but simply 
established a cease fire and a demilitarized zone surrounding the armistice line.  
Between 1953 and 1960, under the Eisenhower Administration, “the United States 
continued a policy of containment of communism and confrontation with the Soviet 
Union.”14  U.S.-PRC relations remained frozen and tensions rose over the defense of the 
offshore Taiwanese islands of Quemoy and Matsu.  While the fighting had stopped on the 
Korean Peninsula, the peace proved to only be temporary before warfare began again in 
Asia, this time in Vietnam.   
The Kennedy Administration abandoned the Eisenhower strategy of massive 
retaliation and instead called for flexible response.  This strategy “called for a regional 
strategy of counterinsurgency to thwart Soviet-backed insurrections in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America.”15  The years leading up to the summer of 1964 were marked by 
significant increases in American forces in Vietnam and a shift in their mission from 
advisors to combatants.  The naval skirmish of August 1964 off the North Vietnamese 
coast resulted in Congress passing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which “became the 
legal basis Presidents Johnson and Nixon used for the American war in Vietnam.”16   
South Korea’s role in the Vietnam War was instrumental in rebuilding its 
economy.  At the request of President Johnson, Park Chung Hee committed Korean 
combat troops in exchange for approximately $1 billion dollars between 1965-70.17  
Thus, “Vietnam became a frontier for Korean enterprise, as many firms, especially 
                                                 
14 Robert D. Schulzinger, U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press 
1998), 232. 
15 Robert W. Love, Jr., History of the U.S. Navy, 1942-1991 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books 1992), 
438. 
16 Schulzinger, 275. 
17 Bruce Cummings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and 
Company 1997), 321.  
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construction companies, got contracts to support the American effort.”18  Economic 
growth was a significant ramification from Korea’s involvement in the war.   
The period between 1969 and 1976 realized a series of shifts in U.S. foreign 
policy in Asia.  Focusing on reducing the U.S. commitment to Vietnam, the Nixon 
Administration was able to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split and attempted to 
isolate China from Vietnam.  U.S. leaders reasoned “that if the North Vietnamese lost 
their major backers they would make peace on America’s terms.”19  The early 1970s also 
brought with it an easing of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
which resulted in arms limitations treaties.   
The beginning of the Carter administration was marked with a new outlook that 
focused on economic and social problems instead of military security.  This approach 
gave way to a harder cold war stance following the events of the late 1970s.  However, 
the conditions were already in place to lead the way for the election of President Reagan.   
The Reagan approach incorporated “an assertive foreign policy that confronted 
the Soviet Union, communism, and revolution.”20  Under the direction of Navy Secretary 
John Lehman, U.S. maritime strategy was “predicated on a strong peacetime forward-
deployed heavy attack carrier force that could both take the offensive in a general war 
and provide the president with a quick-draw intervention option in a regional crisis.”21  
This strategy, and the inability of the Soviet Union to compete in the arms race that 
ensued, caused the Soviet collapse.   
The definitive end of the Cold War in Europe with the dismantling of the Berlin 
Wall, the Soviet Union’s declaration that it would not assist floundering communist 
governments in the Eastern Block and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself were not 
mirrored in East Asia.  “The situation in the Asia-Pacific…for the duration of the Cold 
War was more fluid than in Europe where two tightly coordinated military alliance 
systems confronted each other across clearly defined lines in seemingly implacable 
                                                 
18 Cummings, 321. 
19 Schulzinger, 296. 
20 Ibid., 317. 
21 Love, Jr., 708. 
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hostility.”22  Even today, the absence of a formal multinational military alliance in 
Northeast Asia creates a struggle to maintain a balance of power.   
The continuing expansion of NATO and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact has 
no parallel in Northeast Asia.  “Unlike the situation in Europe, there are no effective 
institutional arrangements that would facilitate collective consideration by the states of 
the Asia-Pacific” towards security problems in the region.23  U.S. security interests in 
East Asia are achieved through bilateral and multilateral agreements with regional 
partners.  
The U.S. policy of containment during the Cold War was based on the region’s 
bipolar and later tripolar circumstances.  The post-Cold War policy of engagement is 
crucial to ensuring a balance of power and security in the region for the future.  The 
security the United States has provided for its allies and friends in the region has allowed 
for the explosive economic growth that occurred in the later half of the twentieth century.  
As the leading naval force in the Pacific, the United States “will continue to exercise 
global leadership in a manner that reflects its national values, promotes, prosperity and 
protects the security of the nation.”24 
B. STRATEGIC INTERESTS 
The U.S. Navy has played an integral role in the strategy and foreign policy of the 
nation since its inception.  “Prior to independence, our fragile colonies clung precariously 
to the coastlines, drawing sustenance from the sea, and maintained vital trading links to 
the old world.”25  The Revenue Cutter Service, the precursor to today’s U.S. Coast 
Guard, and the U.S. Navy have historically focused on providing security for trade and 
enforcing maritime boundaries along the coast and on the high seas.  While the role of the 
Navy has expanded to include various other tasks, these primary missions are still 
important today.  Along the U.S. coast and around the Pacific Rim, including Northeast 
Asia, the Pacific fleet conducts multiple operations to ensure U.S. interests are secure. 
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The Asia-Pacific region encompasses a vast array of geographic and cultural 
differences.  This immense region bordering the world’s largest ocean is home to one 
third of the world’s population.  The region contains the world's six largest armed forces. 
Listed by size they include the following: the Peoples Republic of China, the United 
States, Russia, India, North Korea, and South Korea. 26  In addition, five of the seven 
worldwide U.S. mutual defense treaties are with countries in the Asia-Pacific region.  
They include the U.S.-Republic of the Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, the 
Australia - New Zealand - U.S. (ANZUS) Agreement of 1951, the U.S.-Republic of 
Korea Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953, the South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty  
between the United States, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines 
of 1955, and the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty of 1960.27   
 Predictably, “in the last few decades it has become apparent that, in a rapidly 
shrinking world, relations with the third of humanity that lives in East Asia can directly 
affect the lives of Westerners.”28  The last three major wars that the United States was 
involved in during the twentieth century began in the Asia-Pacific region.  That “the two 
major conflicts of the Cold War era were fought in Korea and Vietnam, points to the 
economic and political importance of the Asia-Pacific to the [former] competing 
superpowers.”  Yahuda continues, “In recent years, the area has emerged as a force in 
international politics in its own right and has acquired a new self-confidence that has 
found expression in astonishing economic achievement.”29  The foreign policy and 
military strategy of the United States will probably continue, over the next century, to 
shift away from a European focus to one that is centered around Asia.   
This transition or “change in emphasis is not being driven by transitory tendencies 
or passing enthusiasms, but rather by deep, long-term shifts in the global distribution of 
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wealth and power.”30  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated repeatedly since 
taking office that the Asia-Pacific region has rapidly growing military and economic 
significance.31 
The U.S. goals of promoting peace, sustaining freedom, and encouraging 
prosperity frame the unique security role of the United States in the world.32  To 
accomplish these goals, the Unites States must maintain a strong force in Northeast Asia.  
Currently the United States “is the only power that has sufficient military capability to 
deter and defend against an act of aggression that would threaten U.S. and allied interests.  
U.S. power is critical to assuring that an equilibrium is maintained in the Asia-Pacific 
region.”33 
The national interests of the United States cover a wide spectrum of issues.  The 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report of September 2001 groups them into three general 
categories.  They are listed as follows: 
• Ensuring U.S. security and freedom of action, including: 
• U.S. sovereignty, territorial integrity, and freedom 
• Safety of U.S. citizens at home and abroad 
• Protection of critical U.S. infrastructure 
• Honoring international commitments, including: 
• Security and well-being of allies and friends 
• Precluding hostile domination of critical areas, particularly Europe, 
Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East and 
Southwest Asia 
• Peace and stability in the Western Hemisphere 
• Contributing to economic well-being, including: 
• Vitality and productivity of the global economy 
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• Security of international sea, air, and space, and information lines 
of communication 
• Access to key markets and strategic resources. 34 
The first tier of national interests encompasses the fundamental concept of 
guaranteeing U.S. security and freedom of action.  The protection of U.S. sovereign 
territory is essential to maintaining the integrity of the country.  This includes using the 
appropriate forces and capabilities to protect U.S. citizens around the globe.  The final leg 
of this component concerns the protection of U.S. transportation and communication 
assets around the world.   
The second tier of national interests covers the United States’ honoring its 
international commitments.  In order to maintain a secure and stable environment the 
United States must work in conjunction with its allies and friends to preserve a global 
balance of power. The United States must act to uphold and further its bilateral and 
multilateral relationships to deter the growth of competitors.   
The sustained growth of the global economy is the third essential tier to the 
interests of the United States.  Contributing to economic well-being through enhancing 
the security of lines of communication and transportation benefits all of the global actors 
involved in the Pacific region.  The principle of promoting prosperity is particularly 
important for the area.  This is especially true since, “figures suggest that the center of 
gravity of the global economy has already shifted from western to eastern Eurasia, and 
that, in spite of some recent setbacks, Asia will consolidate its lead in the years 
immediately ahead.”35   
The maritime strategy of the United States in the Northern Pacific is tailored to 
protect and advance all of these interests.  The long standing U.S. goal in the Pacific has 
been to maintain a strategic balance among the significant actors in the region.  The U.S. 
Pacific Fleet accomplishes this by executing missions that include the ability to respond 
to crises, keep the sea lanes open, deter aggression, provide regional stability, and support 
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humanitarian related activities.36  This is clearly evident in the mission statement of the 
U.S. Pacific Command.  It states, that these forces exist “to enhance security and promote 
peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region by deterring aggression, responding to 
crises and fighting to win.”37 
C. CURRENT STRATEGY 
The events of September 11, 2001 clearly revealed the new security environment 
with which the United States is confronted.  The United States faces fluid and 
unpredictable geopolitical scenarios.  However, recognizable trends can help categorize 
threats to more easily deal with them in the future.  These trends include regional security 
developments in which Northeast Asia is of particular interest.  The strategy of 
countering regional threats is particularly useful because, “along a broad arc of 
instability…the region contains a volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers.”38   
The Pacific Fleet plays a key role in supporting many U.S. vital national interests.  
In the Quadrennial Defense Review Report of September 30, 2001, the Secretary of 
Defense lists the following U.S. strategy: 
• Assuring allies and friends of the United States’ steadiness of purpose and 
its capability to fulfill its security commitments; 
• Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that 
could threaten U.S. interests or those of our allies or friends; 
• Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to 
swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an 
adversary’s military capability and supporting infrastructure; and 
• Decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails. 
This strategy helps ensure that our national interests are achieved.  The 
President’s national security strategy is focused on engagement with other nations.  The 
national security strategy is carried out first by supporting the U.S. allies and friends 
throughout the world.  It is through this “willingness to use force in its own defense and 
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that of others to advance common goals, [that] the United States demonstrates its resolve 
and steadiness of purpose.”39   
The second element of the U.S. defense strategy involves dissuading future 
military competition.  This process encompasses action that influences “the nature of 
future military competitions, channels threats in certain directions, and complicates 
military planning for potential adversaries in the future.”40  The third element of this 
strategy “places emphasis on peacetime forward deterrence in critical areas of the world” 
to prevent aggression or coercion from any adversary. 41  The final portion of the defense 
strategy focuses on the capability the United States must possess to support its allies and 
friends and impose its will to decisively defeat any adversary. 42   
The U.S. Pacific Fleet plays a significant role in accomplishing each element of 
this strategy.  The strategy of the U.S. Pacific Command states, “The Asia-Pacific region, 
with economies, people, and sea lanes, is a vital national interest.  It contains over half of 
the world's surface, and sixty percent of its population, largely along its littorals.  The 
confluence of security, economic, and diplomatic interests in the Asia-Pacific requires us 
to work security issues concurrently.  Security provides the foundation for stability, 
which in turn, yields opportunities for nations to pursue economic prosperity.”43 
The White House document “A National Security Strategy for a New Century,” 
outlines the forward-looking United States approach to national security and 
encompasses three major objectives.  These objectives are clearly the focus of the current 
policies in Northeast Asia.  The core principles are to enhance America’s security, to 
bolster America’s economic prosperity, and to promote democracy and human rights.  
The strategy of engagement is a fundamental element in achieving these objectives.  
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Engagement in Northeast Asia focuses on the threats and opportunities most relevant to 
U.S. interests and applies resources where they can make the greatest difference.44 
The process of countering threats requires three main diplomatic efforts.  These 
are achieved through developing bilateral and multilateral relationships.  First, for 
Northeast Asia, is the continued reinforcement of the U.S. alliances with South Korea and 
Japan.  History has proven that “U.S. alliances, as well as its wide range of bilateral 
security relationships, are a centerpiece of American security.”45  The United States must 
remain committed to developing and sustaining regional security arrangements. This is 
why the United States is committed to enhancing security in Northeast Asia by means of 
a “strong U.S.-ROK defense alliance as a stabilizing pillar for the region.”46   
Former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Dennis C. 
Blair and his primary strategic advisor on the Asia-Pacific, John T. Hanley Jr., stated, 
“U.S. bilateral treaties and security partnerships, backed by capable, forward-stationed 
and forward deployed armed forces, remain the indispensable framework for deterring 
aggression and promoting peaceful development in the region.”47 
The second issue is maintaining a U.S. forward-based presence in the region.  
Admiral Blair continued, “as reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula and across the 
Taiwan Strait progresses, U.S. forward-stationed forces in Japan and South Korea will 
remain an essential part of a security equilibrium, removing incentives for major strategic 
realignments or the buildup of independent military capabilities that would raise tensions 
and spark arms races in the region.”48 
The third concern is developing multilateral regional institutions.  “The defense 
strategy calls for efforts to strengthen America’s alliances and partnerships and to 
develop new forms of security cooperation.”49  These institutions are vital to the future 
                                                 
44 The White House, 3. 
45 Department of Defense, 5. 
46 The White House, 35. 
47 Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley, Jr., “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific 
Security Arrangements,” The Washington Quarterly, 24.1 (2000): 7. 
48 Ibid., 10. 
49 Rumsfeld, 20. 
  19
stability in the region.  Naval cooperation is a central focus in the region due to the 
importance of maritime security to Asia-Pacific theater.   
While many navies in Asia are in their infancy, the 21st century “will almost 
certainly see a continuing evolution of the region’s navies toward balanced sea securing 
capabilities.”50  Hence, the fleets the United States cooperates with in the Pacific region 
utilize varying capabilities to support operations while developing their modern naval 
forces.  This trend will continue in the short term as Asia-Pacific naval fleets grow and 
adopt modern technology. 
All three elements of the current strategy focus on stability in the region which 
leads to market expansion.  Historically, economic growth and continual prosperity have 
evolved from a foundation of security.  U.S. economic objectives in the area consist of 
four key elements.  They are “support for economic reforms and market openings, 
working with international financial institutions to provide well-targeted economic and 
technical assistance in support of economic reforms; providing bilateral humanitarian aid 
and contingency bilateral financial assistance if needed, and urging strong policy actions 
by Japan and other major economic powers to promote global growth.”51  The United 
States is committed to employing these principles in the Republic of Korea to further 
integrate its economy  into the global economy. 
D. SUMMARY 
The United States historically has had a strong maritime tradition in the Asia-
Pacific.  Developing in stages since the founding of the United States, the relationship 
between the United States and countries in the Asia-Pacific region has seen periods of 
territorial expansion, conflict, containment, and engagement.  The U.S. Navy Pacific 
Fleet’s involvement in the region has focused on maintaining stability through a balance 
of power to foster economic growth.   
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The immense size of and cultural differences within the Asia-Pacific region cause 
U.S. interests to span a wide spectrum of issues.  Supporting policies in Northeast Asia 
which ensure security, honor commitments between allies and friends, and contribute to 
economic growth are the focus of U.S. national interests in the region. 
The U.S. strategy supports these interests by assuring allies and friends, 
dissuading adversaries, deterring aggression and coercion, and when necessary decisively 
defeating opponents.  The strategy of engagement provides the United States the ability 
to create a foundation of security that allows for economic growth.  The United States 
counters regional threats through reinforcing U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan, 
maintaining a U.S. forward based presence, and developing multilateral regional 
institutions. 
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF SOUTH KOREAN STRATEGIC 
INTERESTS IN NORTHEAST ASIA AND CURRENT 
STRATEGY 
A. MARITIME HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Bordering the Yellow Sea (West Sea) and the Sea of Japan (East Sea), Korea’s 
geopolitical position between the two great powers of China and Japan has shaped the 
need for the Korean peninsula to maintain a maritime focus.  The peoples that inhabited 
the peninsula have historically had mixed maritime successes.  As a land power with a 
client relationship with China, Korea traditionally maintained a continental, not a 
maritime outlook. 
However, since the Choson period, Korea’s maritime position served an important 
role in the development of Northeast Asia.  Similar to many Western civilizations, the 
early settlers of the Korean peninsula in the hunter-gatherer stages of development looked 
to the sea for sustenance.  The period of hunting and fishing eventually transitioned to 
one focused on agriculture.  Ultimately, residents on the western shores of the peninsula 
used the waterways along the coast to trade with their neighbors.  Circa 384, “the state of 
Paekche, cut off by Koguryo from land contact with China, established tributary relations 
by sea with the southern Chinese dynasty of Eastern Chin.”52 
During the Silla dynasty (668-918), Commissioner Chang Bo-Go (circa 790-846) 
was considered the “Maritime King” of East Asia.  His strengthening of naval forces, 
which established stability on the southwest coast of the peninsula, was a direct result of 
his initiatives to eliminate piracy and the slave trade in the West Sea.  South Koreans 
today revere Commissioner Chang as one of the founders of the nation’s seafaring and 
shipbuilding traditions.53   
While vulnerable to water invasion from all sides of the peninsula, the early 
inhabitants of Korea focused their fortifications more heavily on the threat of land 
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invaders from the north.  Evidence shows that, “the rulers of Korea placed greater 
emphasis on the defense of the northern border than on that of the southern coast.”54  Due 
to the land threats from the north and prolonged periods of stability and peace, Koreans 
have not traditionally needed to recognize the importance of defense from the sea. 
Interrupting these historical cycles of isolation and stability, land and waterborne 
aggressors have repeatedly attacked the Korean peninsula.  “Throughout most of its 
history, Korea has been invaded, influenced, and fought over by its larger neighbors. It 
has suffered approximately 900 invasions during its 2,000 years of recorded history.”55  
Korea was under Mongolian occupation from 1231 until the early 14th century 
and was repeatedly ravaged by Mongol controlled Yuan armies.  During the attempted 
Mongol invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281, “the Koreans were called upon to build 
about nine hundred ships and to furnish great quantities of supplies and military 
contingents.”56  These forces were repelled by storms at sea that the Japanese termed 
divine wind or “kamikaze,” which left Japan free of Mongol rule.  The ability of the 
Korean built ships to survive the typhoons which overwhelmed the fleet, serves as a 
testament to their skill as shipbuilders. 
In the late 1500s, Japanese military ruler Hideyoshi requested Yi dynasty 
assistance and free passage to attack the Chinese mainland through the Korean peninsula.  
This request was denied by the Yi dynasty, and Hideyoshi proceeded to attack the Korean 
peninsula in 1592 and again in 1597.  While the Ming government honored its role as a 
protector and sent troops from China to defend from the north, the main threat to the 
Japanese came from the Korean naval fleet.  This action, led by Admiral Yi Sun-shin, 
“repeatedly defeated the Japanese naval forces and disrupted their communications with 
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his ‘turtle ships,’ which had decks covered with iron plates and are… the world’s first 
armored warships.”57 
Admiral Yi Sun-Shin’s turtle boats and crane formation strategy split the enemy 
and quickly defeated the Japanese force.  The crane formation was an original idea of 
Admiral Yi’s which entailed striking at the enemy with an organized concave arc in the 
lead followed by a convex arc.  This strategy, in addition to the fact that Hideyoshi was 
not aware of “the invention of the turtle ships, dealt successive defeats to the numerically 
superior fleets of Japan.”58   
Admiral Yi is recognized today as the great figure of Korean naval history.  He is 
noted for his technologically advanced ships which were not only the first armor-clad 
warships, but had armaments capable of “shooting flying thunder bombs made of 
gunpowder and iron splinters, [while] laying down a protective smoke screen.”59  
Admiral Yi’s accomplishments would establish the core upon which anti-Japan Korean 
nationalism would be based in the early twentieth century. 
Korean rulers sought isolation from the outside world in the period that followed.  
Bruce Cummings explains,  “for three centuries after the Japanese invasions of the 1590s, 
Korea isolated itself from Japan, dealt harshly with errant Westerners washing up on its 
shores, and kept the Chinese at arm’s length.”60  The “Hermit Kingdom” wished nothing 
more than to retreat inside its shell. 
Through the 1860s, Korea “resisted violently all effort to open trade or even 
negotiate.”61  This countered the Japanese realization of the need to modernize.  The 
diplomatic relations established between Japan and the West were not paralleled on the 
Korean peninsula mainly because the Koreans were not ready to open themselves to the 
outside world. 
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During the 1880s, China attempted to counter Western encroachment utilizing 
traditional methods.  The Japanese, however, were rapidly absorbing Western ideas and 
quickly modernizing.  The Korean peninsula found itself internally divided as “domestic 
struggles between radical and traditional reformers…reflected the progress of 
modernization within her two big neighbors.”62 
Korea's isolation finally ended when Japan sent warships to forcibly open the 
country.  Converging on the peninsula over the next three decades, Chinese, Russian, and 
Japanese competition in Northeast Asia led to armed conflict and foreign intervention.  
The late nineteenth century was a period of intense turbulence on the Korean peninsula.  
The Japanese eventually established dominance, and formally annexed it in 1910.  
Korean leadership had failed to listen and heed Admiral Yi Sun-shin’s recommendation 
circa 1592, that “naval force is the best deterrent to prevent invasion by Japanese pirates 
from the sea.”63 
One of the first attempts to open Korea by the United States occurred in 1866.  
The incident resulted in the death of the crew and the burning of the U.S. merchant 
vessel, “General Sherman,” in the harbor near Pyongyang.  Later, unsuccessful U.S. 
military attempts were eclipsed by Japan.  Patterned after earlier Western unequal treaties 
with China and Japan, Japan forced Korea open in 1876 through the Treaty of Kanghwa.  
Six years later, in 1882, the United States was the first Western power to sign a treaty 
with Korea.  U.S. Navy Commodore Shufeldt established relations through an 1882 
agreement which granted American citizens “trading rights, extraterritoriality, and most-
favored nation treatment.”64 
The Tonghak rebellion, a peasant-based insurrection led by Koreans who desired 
modernization and independence, led to Chinese and Japanese intervention on the 
peninsula.  The Sino-Japanese War which ensued resulted with a Japanese victory.  
Ending the conflict, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed in 1895 and established the 
independence for Korea from China, but Japan’s intrusion was far from over. 
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The Japanese role in Korea now conflicted with Russian interests.  The Russo-
Japanese War in 1904 over Manchuria and Korea ended in another Japanese victory.  
This monumental defeat shocked the world as Russia was the first modern Western 
power ever defeated by an Asian country.  The Treaty of Portsmouth, although viewed by 
Japan as offering too little, “finally established its domination of the peninsula as a 
protectorate.”65   
In the early 1900s, increased domestic factionalism fed on a lack of national unity 
and created impediments to Korean independence and modernization.  This instability led 
to the Japanese colonization and eventual annexation in 1910.  Oppressed under Japanese 
rule, “the example of the naval hero, [Admiral Yi] though deceased for more than three 
centuries by that time, remained the only source of hope and encouragement for hundreds 
and thousands of Korean patriots.”66 
Japanese rule lasted in Korea from 1910 to the end of World War II in 1945.  
Celebrated as Korean Independence Day, August 15, 1945 marks the day Korea was 
liberated from Japanese imperialism.  Following World War II, Koreans that were trained 
and fought under the Japanese as soldiers and sailors eventually became leaders of the 
new Korean Army and coast guard.  
Acknowledging the American ideal of self-determination, but more an expression 
of Allied uncertainty, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek stated 
during the Cairo Conference in December 1943, that “in due course Korea shall become 
free and independent.”67  This uncertainty was readily apparent as the end of the war 
neared. 
The Russian declaration of war on Japan in August 1945, brought with it several 
ramifications on the development of post-war Northeast Asia.  Japan’s rapid surrender in 
contrast to American planning, resulted in the U.S. and Soviet agreement that troops to 
the north of the 38th parallel would surrender to the Soviets and those to the south would 
surrender to the Americans.  The United States was relatively unprepared for the events 
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that followed.  James A. Field, Jr. described the American predicament,: “the defeat of 
Japan was one thing; the simultaneous occupation of key points all along the Asiatic 
littoral was quite another.”68 
While the Cold War was in its infancy, the United States and the Soviet Union 
worked to gain influence and power in Northeast Asia.  During this period, the leadership 
in North and South Korea focused on establishing ground forces to defend their territory.  
In a repetitive fashion, the Korean peninsula was again focusing on its land forces and 
paying little attention to the development of its naval fleet.  The 1943, U.S. State 
Department paper which concluded, “a Soviet occupation of Korea would create an 
entirely new strategic situation in the Far East, and its repercussions within China and 
Japan might be far reaching” was indeed proving to be true.69   
The United States post-war reduction in forces at home and the resulting desire 
for the withdrawal from the Korean peninsula did not foreshadow stability in the region.  
With the plan of a gradual departure, the United States turned the Korean problem over to 
the United Nations General Assembly.  Though somewhat controversial in its outcome, 
the United Nations pressed for elections in Korea, but they were only held in South Korea 
because the Soviet-backed regime in the north would not permit them.  In the spring of 
1948 Syngman Rhee, was elected president of the Republic of Korea.  The Soviet Union 
held so-called elections in the fall of that same year in the North and declared Kim Il-
sung the premier of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). 
Two governments, each claiming its authority over the Korean peninsula, laid the 
foundation for the volatility that followed.  The situation was worsening, “Their 
ideologies stood as opposite poles, as did their great power sponsors, whose relationship 
elsewhere continued to deteriorate.”70  The possibility of peaceful unification was rapidly 
diminishing.   
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Tensions continued to build between the two states and exploded with the 
invasion by the North across the 38th parallel in June of 1950.  The United States under 
UN direction assisted the South Koreans in repelling the aggressors.  An amphibious 
operation from the beginning, the impact of the U.S. Navy and United Nations naval 
forces was immense.   
Luckily, some maritime defense preparations had taken place in the South.  Under 
the direction of then Lieutenant Commander Sohn Won Yil, a Maritime Affairs 
Association was created on August 21, 1945.  This was followed, on November 11 of the 
same year, by the establishment of the coastal defense force.  This date is commemorated 
as the inauguration day of the ROK Navy.71 
The U.S. Coast Guard had been instrumental in establishing and training South 
Korean naval forces following World War II.  U.S. Coast Guard Captain George McCabe 
and Korean Coast Guard Officer Lieutenant Commander Sohn established an officer 
training school in Chinhae, South Korea to train Koreans in coastal maritime defense.  
Winkler describes this event, “in 1946, Captain McCabe led a small contingent of Coast 
Guard personnel to train a South Korean coast guard, which was soon converted into the 
South Korean Navy when war with the North broke out.”72   
When North Korea invaded the South, the Republic of Korea ship “Baek Du San” 
was the only ship in the inventory.  A former United States Merchant Marine Academy 
training ship, it “was purchased by the 7500 officers and men of the South Korean Navy 
in September 1949, at a cost of $18,000 and fitted with guns at Pearl Harbor in January 
1950.”73   
This ship and the others that South Korea acquired primarily played a supporting 
role to the U.S. and British fleets in the conflict.  Under the command of now Admiral 
Sohn, “the South Korean Navy played a key role in capturing and destroying several of 
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the North Korean vessels carrying supplies for the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) ground forces pressing the attack on the Pusan perimeter.”74 
As chief of naval operations during the Korean War, Admiral Sohn successfully 
led numerous maritime operations.  In June 1953, he was appointed minister of national 
defense.  His legacy includes programs that expanded and modernized the ROK Armed 
Forces and aided in national reconstruction.75   
The role naval assets played in offensive and defensive operations, including 
enforcing the blockade, during the Korean War were crucial to obtaining the limited 
objectives necessary to win.  In the end, “the need of a strong, balanced, and adequate 
U.S. Navy for controlling the oceans for our purposes and for denying them to an enemy 
was made elementarily clear.”76   
Although the fighting ended officially in 1953 with a ceasefire agreement, North 
and South Korea are still legally at war today.  “When the U.S. occupation forces were 
withdrawn from the Republic of Korea in July 1949, 79 vessels, mainly of U.S. Navy 
types…were transferred to the Korean Security Forces.”77  In March of 1955, the ROK 
Navy assumed control of its coastal defenses.  The years that followed have focused 
mainly on deterring and defending against aggression from the North, with a recent shift 
towards regional security.   
The ROK naval modernization plan after the Korean War had four distinct 
phases.  The first was the post-war “maintenance” period, which lasted from 1953 to 
1965.  This period began with the Korean naval inventory consisting only of several 
small ships, which included frigates, patrol vessels, minesweepers, submarine chasers, 
auxiliary minelayers, motor torpedo boats, gunboats, patrol boats, landing ships, oilers, 
oceangoing and harbor tugs, and supply ships.  Naval personnel numbered 1,255 officers 
                                                 
74 Winkler, 18. 
75 “The Late Admiral Sohn Won-Yil, The Founder of the ROK Navy (1909-1980).” 
76 Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Mason, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, MD: United States 
Naval Institute 1957), 492. 
77 Blackman, ed., 255.  
  29
and 8,900 enlisted men.78  During this period, the ROK Navy “strengthened the functions 
of support units by establishing shipbuilding depots, supply depots, medical groups, and 
hospitals.”79   
At the completion of the maintenance period in 1965, the ROK naval inventory 
had risen to include a destroyer, frigates, a fast transport, escort vessels, patrol vessels, 
coastal minesweepers, tank landing ships, a rocket landing ship, medium landing ships, 
motor torpedo boats, a landing craft repair ship, supply ships, oilers, and tugs.  Naval 
personnel increased to 1,850 officers, 450 midshipmen, and 14,300 enlisted men.80 
A “build-up of war potential” period followed from 1965-1973.  By 1973, the 
ROK naval inventory had expanded further.  It now consisted of seven destroyers, four 
frigates, six escort transports, 15 patrol vessels, 21 patrol boats, ten coastal 
minesweepers, eight tank landing ships, 12 medium landing ships, one survey ship, and 
13 fleet support ships.  Naval personnel numbered 2,400 officers and 16,500 enlisted.81  
This period was marked by the introduction of destroyers to the fleet.  Initially utilizing 
recommissioned U.S. warships, by 1971 the ROK Navy commissioned its first 
domestically produced destroyer.82 
The next period focused on “constructing the foundation for self-reliant national 
defense” and lasted from 1974 to 1993.  In 1986, the Navy was reorganized into three 
Fleets and in 1987, the Marine Corps was re-established as an independent service.  Other 
significant events during this period include the domestic construction of multiple classes 
of warships and the participation of the ROK Navy with friendly nations in numerous 
combined training exercises.83  In 1993, the ROK naval inventory included  seven 
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submarines, nine destroyers, seven frigates, 26 corvettes, 11 fast attack craft-missile, 66 
fast attack craft-patrol, one mine hunter, eight minesweepers, seven LSTs, seven LSMs, 
16 LCU/LCM, two salvage ships, six tankers, 11 tugs, and seven survey ships.  Naval 
personnel increased to 35,000 sailors of which approximately 5,000 were officers. 84   
The final period lasting from 1994 to present is referred to as the “advanced naval 
period.”  As of 2002, there are eight patrol submarines, 11 midget submarines, eight 
destroyers, nine frigates, 28 corvettes, five fast attack-missile, 85 fast attack-patrol, seven 
mine hunters, eight minesweepers, two minelayers, 10 LSTs, three LSMs, 20 
LCU/LCM/LCF, and three logistic support ships in the inventory.  Naval personnel 
numbers currently consist of 33,000 regulars of which approximately 4,500 are officers, 
in addition to 9,000 reservists.85 
In this current period, the ROK Navy is shifting its focus from coastal defenses 
toward protecting sea lines of communication which are the lifelines of the Korean 
economy.86  These successive modernization programs and increases in strength of the 
fleet reflect South Korea’s growing strategic interests in the region. 
B. STRATEGIC INTERESTS 
South Korea’s historically vulnerable position between China and Japan has 
caused many people to refer to it as “the shrimp between the whales.”  This historical 
relationship resonates in Northeast Asian politics today.  It defines Korea “as a border 
state for the major powers and a relatively weak power in relation to its immediate 
neighbors.”87 
The Korean people’s “experience in a security-scarce region naturally makes 
balance of power politics the primary template for the Korean strategic mindset.”88  
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Korea’s balance of power approach has historically placed it in bilateral relationships.  
Seeking stability, Korea has traditionally built its strength through an alliance with a 
strong power or through an alliance with another power against the strong power.   
Korea’s strategy and strategic culture is a direct consequence of its geographical 
position.  Korea’s “strategic culture is compatible with regional peace and stability.”89  In 
general, through political and diplomatic measures, not military might, Korea has 
managed to maintain its existence by cooperating with its neighbors throughout history.  
The distances between neighbors are becoming increasingly smaller in the 
technologically advanced and economically intertwined world.   
Northeast Asia “is a geographical arena in which the military programs, 
intelligence efforts, and diplomatic behavior of the inhabitants are increasingly 
interdependent.”90  The growing importance of the maritime theater is becoming 
progressively more significant because of the number of nations bordering or in the 
proximity of the Pacific Ocean and its tributaries.  Additionally, in the Asia-Pacific 
region, over 70 percent of the population lives in coastal areas.   
South Korea, as a modern member of the Northeast Asian community, finds itself 
in a maritime environment that is rapidly changing.  The region has entered “an era of 
profound strategic change that is making it particularly hazardous to predict the future.”91  
South Korea is changing its strategic interests to include a strong maritime outlook.  It is 
overturning its predominant historic lack of interest in maritime affairs, taking advantage 
of the geographic and physical characteristics which support the Korean peninsula’s wide 
range of maritime interests.  These include defense and economic concerns. 
Korea’s strategic interests are defined by three national goals.  Korea’s national 
security strategy is evolving “towards devising the means to achieve a small, but sound 
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and strong nation-state.”92  Three significant interests are listed in the ROK’s 2000 
Defense White Paper, as follows: 
• Korea will uphold its nationhood, seek peaceful unification, and ensure 
lasting independence under the ideologies of free democracy. 
• Korea will protect the freedom and rights of its citizens and create a social 
welfare system that achieves equality in their standard of living. 
• Korea will work to improve its status in the international community in 
order to put forth dignity as a nation and contribute to world peace.93 
The first goal requires the ROK to “establish a firm security posture, which will 
deter the North’s armed invasion and stimulate reconciliation and cooperation between 
the two countries.”94  The second goal focuses on achieving and sustaining a stable 
economic system which will allow for the incorporation of the North Korean economy 
while benefiting both states.  The third goal incorporates the idea of increasing diplomatic 
efforts between the Koreas and the world to resolve the years of conflict on the peninsula 
in addition to finding new ways for the Koreas to participate in global affairs. 
On a still broader scale, the foundations of Korean national security are focused 
on three conditions.  The first is to maintain defenses to ensure territorial integrity, re-
unify the peninsula peacefully, and support the ideology behind free democracy.  The 
second category is centered around protecting the rights of the people and instilling in 
them the will to protect their institutions.  The third concept encompasses the notion of 
improving the political and social structures upon which society depends.95   
Each of these national goals supports the need for the ROK to expand its outlook 
from focusing largely on defense to focusing on economic growth and prosperity.  South 
Korea’s “Force Improvement Plans (FIP) indicate a gradual shift in focus from traditional 
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ground-based contingencies to regional ones.”96  South Korean interests are changing 
from an inward defensive focus to one which incorporates global economic opportunities.   
South Korea’s shifting interests and recognition of the importance of regional sea 
lines of communication for trade and security purposes have increased the need for naval 
capabilities.  “In the contemporary period, Korea’s rise as a leading trading country and 
its increasingly significant use of maritime transportation has resulted in a renewed 
emphasis on the importance of sea power both in terms of its continued economic 
prosperity and national security.”97  Korean naval interests have gradually shifted from 
coastal defense to having a regional security focus due to the economic importance of the 
sea. 
South Korea has predominantly designed its naval force structure to complement 
the ROK Army and U.S. forces in defense against the North.  Deadly naval 
confrontations in the Yellow (West) Sea in June of 1999 and again in June of 2002, 
demonstrate the necessity for this force.  The battle, which lasted over twenty minutes, 
occurred near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) which is the sea boundary that extends out 
from the DMZ.  The June 2002 clash, “left a South Korean patrol boat sunk, with four 
confirmed dead, one missing, and 20 injured,” and  unconfirmed reports indicated, “as 
many as 30 North Korean sailors were killed by return fire.”98  While this incident shows 
the importance of maintaining coastal defenses today, looking to the future, South Korea 
is shifting to a more blue water capability.   
C. CURRENT STRATEGY 
South Korea is continuing to develop as a regional power.  “Strategically, it is of 
the utmost importance to all the nations of the Asia-Pacific to have in place a stable 
maritime regime.”99  To achieve its strategic objectives, South Korea implements 
numerous policies focused on maintaining security and stability. 
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In the fluid and unpredictable environment of Northeast Asia, there are a number 
of interests which must be addressed when determining a current strategy.  “While the 
main security threats and challenges to stability are generally agreed to, how they will be 
resolved or managed is not.”100 
South Korea’s defense objective that “the ROK military will defend the nation 
from external military threats and invasion, uphold peaceful unification, and contribute to 
regional stability and world peace” is achieved through the five key points.101  They are 
listed in the ROK Defense White Paper, 2000, as follows: 
• Establishment of a firm defense posture 
• Aiming for advanced, high quality national defense 
• Devising military policy toward the North and defusing tension on the 
Korean peninsula 
• Improving the ROK-US alliance and strengthening security cooperation 
with neighboring major powers 
• Cultivating an “Armed Forces of the People” that works harmoniously 
with the people.102 
Each key point plays an integral role in achieving the national defense objectives 
of the ROK.  The first focuses on making certain the “military is ready to deter the 
enemy’s armed provocation and ensure total victory in war.”103  Simply, the ROK 
prepares for conflict through education and training of its armed forces.  The second 
encompasses the “the vision or blueprint for the military’s plan for the 21st century and 
points the way to the successful accomplishment of given tasks and to achieving the 
overall defense objectives.”104  In other words, this point concerns the importance of 
transformation in the strategy of the future.   
The third key point centers on minimizing hostilities with North Korea and 
looking for ways to work towards peaceful unification.  The fourth point looks at the 
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ROK-U.S. relationship and its impact on the security and economy of the peninsula.  It 
also includes looking for ways to improve security cooperation through multilateral 
institutions with neighboring countries.  The final point considers the importance of a 
balanced comprehensive security system between the civilian and military sectors.   
Examining the mission of the ROK Navy helps to assess its role in achieving 
these objectives.  The mission statement consists of two elements.  First, “the mission of 
the Navy during peacetime is not only to deter war, but also to protect national and 
maritime sovereignty, and perform activities that support national foreign policies and 
enhance national prestige.”105  As a maritime force defending a peninsula, the Navy must 
be capable of preventing conflict and defending sovereign territory. 
During periods of conflict, the ROK Navy’s mission expands.  The “mission 
during war is to guarantee the safety of activities at sea by protecting the sea lines of 
communication (SLOC), the lifeline of the country, and by exercising control over the 
sea.”106  The wartime mission increases to include safeguarding economic stability while 
carrying out offensive actions.   
The South Korean Navy is organized under the chief of naval operations, 
currently Admiral Lee Soo Yong, into three operational commands.  Rear admirals, as 
commanders of each individual fleet, report to a vice admiral who is the commander in 
chief of the fleet.  Fleet Headquarters and the Third Fleet are located in Chinhae which is 
on the southeast coast near Pusan.  The First Fleet is located in Donghae which is on the 
northeast coast near Kangnung and the Second Fleet recently relocated to Pyongtaek, 
which is on the northwest coast south of Inchon.   
In 1978, under the premise of an anticipated U.S. withdrawal from the region a 
bilateral agreement established the Combined Forces Command.  This integrated 
organization is led by a U.S. four star general with a ROK four star as deputy 
commander.  Integration is apparent throughout the command because all “components 
are tactically integrated through continuous combined and joint planning, training and 
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exercises.”107  The alliance relationship with the United States is especially significant to 
the ROK’s involvement in several of these training exercises.   
Training in many warfare dimensions, to include undersea warfare, surface 
warfare, and air warfare, allows the ROK Navy to practice command of the sea.  Joint 
exercises focusing on multi-threat complex war scenarios have also become an integral 
part of the fleet’s training regimen.  108  Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) is an annual command 
post exercise that has been practiced since 1976.  This combined forces exercise 
“provides senior commanders and their staffs in the Korean Theater with an advanced 
training environment for improving their command and control, staff procedures, 
decision making and warfighting skills.”109  The ROK Navy participates in numerous 
ROK-US joint training exercises such as Foal Eagle and Team Spirit. 
Multinational training exercises play a significant role in preparing the fleet for 
conflict.  In 1990, the ROK Navy participated in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 
Exercise for the first time.  This biennial exercise incorporates several nations from 
around the Pacific including countries from North America, South America, Australia, 
and Northeast and Southeast Asia.  Its main focus since 1971 has been to provide the 
opportunity to enhance cooperation between Pacific allies and promote stability in the 
region.110 
South Korea is an active member in international organizations such as the United 
Nations (UN).  “In August 1991, South Korea joined the United Nations…and since then 
has been active in most UN specialized agencies and many international forums.”111  
South Korea’s participation in regional and global organizations is important for stability 
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in Northeast Asia.  As the ROK Navy expands and becomes more capable, its ability to 
participate in regional and international affairs will increase.  
Naval modernization programs play an important role in the current and future 
strategic aims of South Korea.  The ROK Navy is rapidly expanding and becoming 
increasingly sophisticated.  “By decades end, the ROK Navy will be a well-balanced, 
regional naval force.”112  The ROK Navy is aggressively modernizing its fleet by 
investing in advanced technology that will give it capabilities to operate for extended 
periods in the open ocean.   
The ROK is pursuing modernization programs especially through its submarine 
and destroyer platforms.  The ROK Navy is completing the series of nine Type 209 
submarines and three Type 214 class boats with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) are 
scheduled to enter service in 2007.  These advanced diesel-electric boats will give the 
ROK Navy an increased range and detection potential in its deterrent capability.  The 
KDX-II destroyer program has increased to include six ships up from the three originally 
planned.  These gas turbine powered, air capable ships equipped with vertical launching 
missile systems, exponentially improve the ROK Navy’s capabilities.  The KDX-III 
future guided missile destroyer (DDG) program includes up to six platforms displacing 
approximately 10,000 tons to be commissioned in 2009.  Very similar to the U.S. Arleigh 
Burke class destroyers, KDX-III ships in addition to having the capabilities of the KDX-
II will be equipped with phased-array radar systems.113   
The ROK’s decision to use the U.S. designed Lockheed Martin Aegis phased 
array radar combat system for its KDX-III combat system makes it the fifth navy in the 
world to do so, behind the United States, Japan, Norway and Spain.114  The choice was 
based on several factors, most notable being “U.S. guarantees over the release of 
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Standard Missile Block IV missiles, which would confer KDX-3 with an area-wide 
theatre ballistic missile defense capability.”115  
Korean President Kim Dae-jung stated, in the spring of 2001, that “in the near 
future, our navy will have a strategic task force for protecting the national interests and 
international peace in blue-water scale.”116  This statement accompanied with the recent 
modernization initiatives confirms the ROK Navy is shifting its defense strategy from a 
coastal to a regional focus.   
D. SUMMARY 
The peoples that inhabited the Korean peninsula have historically had mixed 
maritime successes.  While vulnerable to water invasion from the three sides of the 
peninsula, the early inhabitants of Korea focused their fortifications more heavily on the 
threat of land invaders from the north.  Admiral Yi Sun-shin, the great figure of Korean 
naval history, repelled the Japanese invasions of the peninsula in the 1590’s due to his 
invention of the first iron-clad warship.   
Korea was able to remain isolated from the outside world until the late nineteenth 
century.  Foreign intervention and armed conflict resulted in Japanese dominance over 
the peninsula which lasted from its annexation in 1910 through the end of WWII.  
Following World War II, the fight to gain influence and power over the Korean peninsula 
erupted in the Korean War.  Since the signing of the armistice in Korea, the ROK Navy 
has focused primarily on coastal defense capabilities.  The ROK Navy has predominantly 
designed its naval force structure to complement the ROK Army and U.S. forces in 
defense against the North.  Naval clashes in the Yellow (West) Sea in June 1999 and 
again in June 2002 demonstrate the necessity for this capability.  As Korea looks towards 
the future, this strategy is changing as it redirects its outlook to a more regional security 
focus. 
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South Korea, as a modern member of the Northeast Asian community, finds itself 
in a maritime environment that is rapidly changing.  Shifting beyond a coastal to a 
regional mindset, South Korean interests are changing from an inward defensive focus to 
one which incorporates global economic opportunities.  South Korea’s changing interests 
and the recognition of the importance of sea lines of communication for trade and 
security purposes have increased the need for naval capabilities.   
South Korea is developing its role as a regional power.  The ROK Navy is rapidly 
expanding and becoming increasingly sophisticated.  Through modernization programs 
focusing on its destroyer and submarine fleets, South Korea is becoming a well-balanced, 
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IV. UNITED STATES REGIONAL CONCERNS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION 
The following examines major areas of concern and possible opportunities for 
cooperation among the major actors in Northeast Asia.  The 2000 ROK Defense White 
Paper notes, “the United States, Japan, China, and Russia constitute the four nations with 
special interest in and powerful influence over Northeast Asia and the Korean 
Peninsula.”117  Organized by country, this chapter examines common themes and how 
they influence U.S. interests in the region. 
A. ROK 
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the U.S. role as a major 
influence upon South Korean foreign policy has shifted.  As South Korea’s involvement 
in the international community has grown, U.S. influences have lessened proportionally 
to other actors.  “The post-Cold War environment has provided the ROK with new 
opportunities to develop international links and to diversify its foreign and defense 
policies.”118  This relative reduction in power gives rise to new concerns and 
opportunities between the United States and the major powers in Northeast Asia. 
U.S.-ROK concerns focus on ensuring stability in the region for the indefinite 
future.  In accordance with the U.S. policy on the Korean peninsula to reduce tension and 
deter war, the United States has pursued goals of stability through bilateral alliances with 
South Korea and Japan.  Clearly, “the long-term prosperity of the United States, 
particularly in light of this globally-connected economy, rests on stability, and 
particularly on stability within Asia and the Pacific Rim.”119 
Security relationships between the United States and other countries in the Asia 
Pacific region are predominantly bilateral.  The lack of a multilateral security alliance in 
the region presents unique challenges “because what is fundamentally good for one 
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country may not necessarily be good for the country—or countries—on its immediate 
borders.”120  Stability in the region among the major actors in the future could be 
achieved through a cooperative security arrangement.   
U.S. concerns for the future revolve around its ability to continue to pursue its 
interests in the region.  ROK Navy Commander Kim Duk-ki states, “The United States 
has shown that the major principles of its Asia-Pacific strategy include forward 
deployment, overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangements not only to keep regional 
stability, but also to preserve its interests.”121  The U.S. goal of continued economic 
prosperity is intricately linked with the security and stability of Northeast Asia.  
Following the Asian economic crisis in 1997, “radical reform measures taken to 
strengthen the market economy and to improve foreign investment” led to a “substantial 
expansion in the ROK’s trading and economic ties” worldwide.122  U.S. support 
following the economic crisis came in the form of significant reductions in cost to 
maintain U.S. troops on the peninsula and by extending time periods to repay debts on 
military equipment.123 
Existing security “problem areas are fueled by the trends in economic and 
population growth.”124  An expanding link has developed between Asian markets and the 
world.  Competition over limited resources and energy is exacerbated by the current 
population growth.  Pressure to continue the economic boom and provide jobs for the 
increasingly urban population that is predominantly young and male, foreshadows several 
security issues. 
South Korea’s recent approach to the U.S.-ROK alliance has followed a trend 
shifting from the historically U.S. dominant relationship towards a more equal 
                                                 
120 Ibid., 114. 
121 Kim Duk-ki, Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia, Geo-strategic Goals, Policies, and Prospects 
(London, England: Frank Cass Publishers 2000), 98. 
122 “South Korea, External Affairs, International Relations,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment- 
China and Northeast Asia, 19 July 2002, www.janes.com [9 September 2002]. 
123 “South Korea, External Affairs, United States,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment- China and 
Northeast Asia, 19 July 2002, www.janes.com [9 September 2002]. 
124 Steele, 116. 
  43
relationship in a cooperative setting.  The Bush administration’s initial reluctance for any 
dialogue with North Korea and its categorization as one of members of the “axis of evil, 
has strained relations and led to considerable criticism in South Korea of Bush’s policy 
toward the Korean peninsula.”125 
However, the U.S. role in South Korea is valuable to both partners.  In an 
interview in 2002, Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific 
Fleet, stressed the importance of maintaining the capabilities of the U.S. Navy in the 
region.  He stated, “Influencing events ashore requires a forward deployed naval force 
that continues to be agile, combat-ready and fully capable of leading or participating in 
joint and coalition operations.”  Stressing thevalue of remaining forward deployed, he 
added, “This means we must be able to establish and sustain a presence wherever 
needed…whether on the high seas or in a contested littoral zone.”  In the end, “our ability 
to command the seas and then influence events ashore is a prerequisite to all follow-on 
joint and coalition operations.”126 
Due to the flexibility of naval forces, it is likely that the maritime component of 
the U.S.-ROK alliance will play a greater role as the unification process progresses 
between the two Koreas.  The alliance structure can make arrangements now to cope with 
the possible ROK defense shift in structure from a ground to maritime foundation.  
“Government officials in Washington and Seoul state unequivocally that the alliance will 
remain intact even after the peninsula’s security stabilizes.  Yet, the ROK exhibits a clear 
preference for building more autonomous defense capabilities in the future.”127  These 
defense capabilities can be used in a cooperative arrangement with other actors in the 
region to ensure stability. 
The United States can prepare now with the ROK to manage the security 
environment of the future.  As South Korea becomes more capable of independently 
protecting its interests, cooperative relationships will prevent the escalation of animosity 
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between powers.  It is appropriate now “to change the U.S.-ROK security alliance from 
one which is designed to cope only with the North Korean threat, to one which is 
designed to maintain and enhance regional stability and peace in Northeast Asia.”128 
Through a cooperative security framework, the United States can maintain its 
presence and strengthen its ties with its current allies and friends in the region.  A 
multilateral cooperative security framework “will not only strengthen understanding of 
mutual security needs but also broaden the definition of security beyond the traditional 
approach of unilateral defense.”129  A series of cooperative security agreements may be 
necessary to fulfill the need for stability in Northeast Asia.   
Unlike common bilateral agreements between countries in the area, cooperative 
security should focus on “security with rather than against the adversary.”130  Sharing 
common interests, under a cooperative security arrangement, countries can prepare now 
to prevent conflict versus preparing for conflict.  Working together to achieve common 
goals in this context, countries in Northeast Asia can build on existing bilateral 
agreements to realize not only maritime security but broadened objectives.  The 
foundation for a cooperative security arrangement can first be established through naval 
cooperation.  On a broad level, “multinational naval cooperation to maintain international 
order could be viewed as part of the diplomatic roles of navies.”131  Naval fleets have the 
advantage of flexibility and sustainability that offers high political gain at relatively low 
risk. 
Several emerging issues in Northeast Asia establish the need for naval 
cooperation.  One issue covers the rapid economic development that has led to marine 
pollution.  With a non-military focus, this element has the potential to act as a starting 
point for cooperation.  From an economic viewpoint, the region’s sea lines of 
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communication and their importance to trade with other nations outside of Northeast Asia 
are another maritime issue.  Maritime stability through cooperative security would benefit 
all of the involved powers and advance their economic interests.132   
The current naval arms build-up is also an issue for the countries in the region.  
China, Japan, and the ROK are rapidly acquiring modern technologically advanced naval 
platforms.  Two significant events have caused this increase.  First is the partial power 
vacuum left by the Soviet Union’s withdrawal.  Second, recent economic growth has 
spurred the need for the traditional naval role of protection of sea routes.  Through the 
creation of a cooperative security arrangement, the need for large fleets can be 
reduced.133   
Regional territorial disputes, which are mainly maritime in nature, are another 
area of concern.  The confidence building measures that could evolve from a cooperative 
security arrangement may lessen the strain between participants.  A final issue 
encompasses emerging conflicts stemming from offshore natural resources under and 
above the seafloor.  Cooperation between affected countries could also lead to a reduced 
threat of conflict in this area through open communication regarding needs and 
interests.134  These issues show that “a broader network of cooperative maritime security 
is essential in Northeast Asia where a host of political, economic, and military factors 
contribute to an uncertain and changing environment.”135 
The U.S. position as the only superpower and its history of successful bilateral 
agreements with the ROK and Japan establishes the precedent for the actors in Northeast 
Asia to permit the United States to take the initiative in assuming the role of security 
coordinator of the region.  As proven in the past, “a primary objective of U.S. security 
cooperation will be to help allies and friends create favorable balances of military power 
in critical areas of the world to deter aggression or coercion.”136  An initial trilateral 
                                                 




136 Department of Defense, 11. 
  46
cooperative agreement between the United States, South Korea, and Japan would serve as 
a foundation for future expansion. 
The arrangement by design should be “agile and adaptable…to posture the United 
States, allies, and friends to respond effectively to surprises when they occur.”137  To 
ensure continued success the agreement should allow China and Russia  to maintain some 
degree of influence in the region.  It is important to balance concerns and interests of 
each country in the region; for example, Japan’s requirement of maintaining a strong 
deterrence against a rapidly emerging China must be satisfied.  However, this should 
balance against providing a stable framework for China’s economic growth and political 
stability.138 
A cooperative naval security agreement should provide for the ramifications of a 
unified Korea.  For U.S. planners it should be assumed that “the reunification of Korea 
will most certainly affect the size of the land component of any force [they] keep in 
Asia.”139  Naval forces will become increasingly important as Asian countries push to 
have American provided security in the region, off the coast or in someone else’s 
country, but not in theirs.   
If the United States establishes a cooperative security environment today, it may 
ease the transition of U.S. force levels following unification.  Relations in the region 
would remain more stable if the U.S. presence did not completely disappear.  Thus, “if a 
unified Korea was allied with the United States and some U.S. forces remained in Korea, 
[it is possible] Korea would not feel the need to possess weapons of mass destruction and 
would allow Japan’s defense capability to remain unchanged.”140   
If a unified Korea emerges as a strong state, the possibility of it continuing to 
focus on naval development is high.  As this transition from a ground foundation to a 
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maritime outlook occurs, the establishment of a greater U.S. naval presence in Korea 
would increase stability in the new state and ease the transition for the region. 
Through the use of cooperative security, historical bilateral animosities can be 
avoided in the future.  Chinese and Russian leaders would have less reason to fear a 
unified Korea if there were open communications avenues available through cooperative 
security.  The U.S.-Japanese relationship would also be strengthened because of the 
balancing effect it would have on the region.  
B. DPRK 
The state of the North Korean’s bankrupt economy is “the greatest obstacle to its 
vision of a socialist state and national security.”141  The current trend in the DPRK is to 
try to maintain a balance between executing reforms in order to receive economic aid and 
opening itself up to the international community that could lead to the downfall of the 
regime.  The DPRK has found limited success in this endeavor through restricting its 
amount of cooperation and maintaining a lack of transparency by its threat to act 
irrationally. 
The ravished economic sector in North Korea is a significant impediment to its 
stability.  The 2000 ROK Defense White Paper illustrates the need for change stating 
that, “A bold open policy and economic reform of the market is needed for the normal 
development of North Korea’s economy and without sweeping changes at a fundamental 
level, hope for economic recovery is dim.”142  To avoid these necessary sweeping 
changes, North Korea is looking to external economic support to prolong regime survival.   
The ROK views the DPRK as the number one threat to its sovereignty.  
Constantly raising its level of combat effectiveness, through exercises and continued 
production of military equipment, the DPRK military is showing little sign of decline.  
Even following the success of the inter-Korean dialogue in June 2000, “no substantial 
changes to the internal military activity are visible except for the cessation of the 
disparaging broadcasts at the demilitarized zone (DMZ).”143 
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The situation between North and South Korea remains extremely volatile.  The 
DPRK is continuously attempting to increase its military offensive capability through the 
development of weapons of mass destruction and long range missiles.  As a counter to 
this capability, the United States initiated a policy aimed at curtailing North Korean 
efforts.  During the Clinton administration, the United States attempted to build DPRK 
confidence through engagement.  Shifting towards a de facto two Korea policy, the 
United States provided “security for both Koreas through stabilization of each regime’s 
adversarial strategic relationship.”144  Working through the U.S.-ROK alliance “a form of 
double containment” resulted.145 
This policy has been met with limited success.  However, military conflict is 
progressively more unlikely to occur, since North Korea does not possess the food, 
ammunition, or fuel to last beyond the initial attack.  In addition, “North Korea today is 
not in a political or economic position to rationally initiate war against the South.”146   
Despite this situation, repeated incursions from the North continue to occur into 
the ROK.  Due to the construction and deployment of midget submarines for infiltration 
purposes and no reduction in the number of exercises, there is ample reason for South 
Korea to be concerned.  Recent events such as the remarking of the western Northern 
Limit Line (NLL) in September 1999, and the “Declaration of Order of Navigation 
Around Five South Korean Islands on the West Sea” increases apprehension in the South 
towards the North.147   
The clashes between the North and South Korean Navies are one of the most 
substantial areas of concern between the two countries.  In June 1999, “after several days 
of maneuvering, South Korean Navy vessels sank a North Korean torpedo boat with at 
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least a dozen men aboard,” after it had crossed over the NLL.148  This “was the result of 
the DPRK’s decision to no longer recognize the NLL set by the UN in 1953.”149 
In June 2002, another clash occurred.  According to Seoul military officials, “two 
North Korean Navy gunboats opened fire when they were challenged by two South 
Korean patrol craft for crossing…an extension of the land boundary between North and 
South.”150  Unlike the South Korean victory in June 1999, this clash ended with four 
South Korean sailors dead, 20 wounded, one missing and the sinking of the vessel.  
Unconfirmed reports indicated, “as many as 30 North Korean sailors were killed by 
return fire.”151   
Following this most recent incident, South Korean leaders received approval from 
the defense ministry to “fire on enemy ships after firing warning shots and no longer had 
to wait to be fired on first.”152  The event, which resulted in building greater animosity 
between the two states, also threatened efforts to resume U.S.-DPRK talks.  However, 
approximately one month later in July 2002, “North Korea issued a surprising expression 
of regret…and called for cabinet-level talks with South Korea.”153   
Shortly after President Kim Dae-jung entered office in 1998, he announced a new 
approach to North Korean affairs.  Departing from President Kim Young-sam’s policy 
that did not rule out forceful absorption of the North, Kim Dae-jung proposed a policy of 
engagement supported by strong deterrence.  This approach was labeled the “Sunshine 
Policy” and focused on separating politics from economic aid and encouraged private 
sector dealing with the North.  In addition, it pledged not to absorb the DPRK through 
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force.  The policy resulted in the first ever meeting of the heads of state of the two 
countries since the division in 1953.154   
At the time, “the symbolic summit appeared to have succeeded in preparing the 
ground for increased diplomatic, cultural and economic links, and instigated a more 
stable and peaceful future for the Korean peninsula and surrounding region.”155  This 
spirit of reconciliation has been significantly reduced following tumultuous North Korean 
relations with the United States.  The Bush administration’s hard line stance against 
North Korea and the inclusion of it as a member of the “axis of evil” does not foreshadow 
short-term improved relations between the United States and the DPRK.  
While there are advantages to the maintenance of stability in the region with two 
separate Koreas, the eventual unification of the Korean peninsula if handled correctly 
could establish a greater level of stability.  U.S., DPRK, and ROK leaders can plan now 
for the accommodation of U.S. forces on the peninsula following unification.  While 
there are limited areas for cooperation in the current political structure, the removal of the 
U.S. relationship after unification is probably remote.  The ROK 2000 Defense White 
Paper clearly states, “Even after unification, it is expected that the alliance will contribute 
greatly to the security of the Northeast Asian region.”156  The U.S. role as a mutual ally 
to both the ROK and Japan is likely to continue well into the future. 
C. JAPAN 
Japan and Korea have several areas of concern that create foreign relations 
problems between the two countries.  The most significant is their historical relationship.  
“Korea’s future is of immense strategic importance for Japan, but the Japanese, for 
reasons of history, cannot easily play an activist, unilateral role there.”157  Overcoming or 
working through this impediment is a key factor in improving their relationship in the 
form of  a cooperative security framework.  
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Historical problems beset many elements of the relationship, the most recent of 
which is the textbook controversy.  South Korea resents the sanitized versions with which 
Japanese authors depict their country’s aggression during World War II.  Due to these 
textbook disagreements, in May 2001, the South Korean defense ministry “indefinitely 
postponed the second joint navy search-and-rescue drill with Japan…saying the exercise 
should be based on correct understanding of history and overall trust between the two 
nations.”158   
As the two countries move beyond this issue and towards a cooperative 
relationship, Japan will most likely not take a leadership role in the structure.  Because of  
constitutional constraints and residual animosity from World War II among the countries 
in Northeast Asia towards Japan, the region would remain more stable if Japan were a 
participant, but not the controlling party in future cooperative arrangements. 
The U.S. presence has historically added to the stability of the region.  Analysts 
suggest, “Japan’s strategic position relative to China, the Koreas, and other East Asian 
neighbors is served by continued U.S. military presence.  U.S. presence effectively 
defuses the power advantage of Japan relative to these nations.”159  The U.S. role in a 
cooperative security arrangement would continue to serve this purpose and allay regional 
fears. 
Sea lines of communication in Southeast Asia are vital to the economies of nearly 
all of the countries in Northeast Asia.  Providing security for common choke points 
serves as a prime example of one of the capabilities a cooperative naval security 
arrangement could provide.  Due to the nature of the Japanese economy and the 
importance of ocean commerce, “the main thrust of Japan’s maritime defense effort is 
likely to continue to remain directed at the creation of an effective protection of 
shipping.”160  As ROK naval expansion continues, it too will expand its focus towards 
this mission.   
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The regional institution Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is intended 
to increase cooperation in the Pacific Rim.  The forum functions to build economic 
cooperation and increase trade and investment liberalization among member nations.161  
Preventing a repeat of the Asian economic crisis that began in 1997 and the current 
Japanese economic stagnation are key concerns for all of the countries in the region.  In 
addition, there is apprehension in Japan regarding the potential of the Korean economy.  
Fears surround the possible ramifications a strong unified Korean economy may have on 
Japanese interests.   
Japan and South Korea have many common concerns regarding North Korea.  
Both countries have maintained close ties on this issue, and Seoul has encouraged Tokyo 
to normalize relations with Pyongyang in the interest of stabilizing the region.  In 
September 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi met with North Korean leader Kim 
Jong Il in Pyongyang.  The one-day summit, which was the first of its kind between the 
two states, resulted in North Korea admitting to and apologizing for abducting Japanese 
citizens in the 1970s and 1980s.  North Korea also promised to continue its missile firing 
moratorium indefinitely and to stop incursions by North Korean ships into Japanese 
waters.  Both leaders announced that normalization talks would resume in October 
2002.162 
The United States supports these talks and welcomes the possibility of diplomatic 
success that may increase the transparency of the North Korean regime.  The United 
States, Japan, and South Korea have worked closely together to formulate a strategy of 
how to deal with North Korea.  Through the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group 
(TCOG), they coordinate the U.S., Japanese and South Korean policy towards North 
Korea.163 
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The United States also has an important role in Japanese and South Korean 
military relations.  The United States acts as a buffer to control tensions between the two 
states.   Japanese defense forces are extremely capable and their ability to play a strong 
role in security of the region is unparalleled by others in Northeast Asia.  South Korea is 
apprehensive about Japanese military capabilities.  Japan’s significant force allows it to 
“easily be seen as a military great power in the region based on its conventional naval and 
air forces alone, despite their largely defensive nature.”164   
In the past decade the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) has 
established itself as a modern technologically advanced fleet.  In a cooperative security 
arrangement, having these forces available to conduct operations would be beneficial to 
other members.  ROK naval modernization goals include eventually possessing 
capabilities that would establish parity between the ROK Navy and the JMSDF.165   
Former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Dennis  Blair 
commented on managing security in Northeast Asia stating, “The most effective method 
is to develop policy coordination, including combined military cooperation, on a 
particular regional security issue or a series of related security issues.”166  Beginning with 
naval cooperation today, the framework can be established for security in the region 
following the eventual unification of Korea. 
Moving U.S. bilateral relationships with Japan and South Korea towards a 
cooperative security arrangement may be seen as a natural progression.  “The Japanese-
U.S. security alliance has been the most effective vehicle to date for maintaining U.S. 
military presence in the region and for increasing Japanese responsibility sharing.”167  
Creating the structure for cooperation between the three countries can be based on 
multiple common interests.   
Numerous common maritime interests establish this need.  “Navies are uniquely 
suited for multilateral cooperation because of their intrinsic unobtrusive nature as over-
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the-horizon security forces, out of public view.  Navies also share common cultures and 
could build on their common traditions.”168  A relationship beginning in a maritime 
context is a practical way to stabilize the region.   
The U.S.-ROK-Japanese relationship can continue working toward cooperation 
on three levels.  The first level involves continued confidence building measures focusing 
on building mutual trust.  Through communication, personnel exchanges, and port visits, 
an open, trustful relationship can continue to develop.  Second, cooperation for common 
maritime purposes such as marine pollution, terrorism, piracy, and drug smuggling will 
increase ties by working together towards common goals.  In the distant future, these 
fundamental measures could lead to an eventual multinational security system.  169 
Cooperative measures are in place today in several of these areas.  There has 
already been naval cooperation between South Korea and Japan.  In August 1999, “a joint 
search-and-rescue exercise by the South Korean navy and the MSDF in the open seas off 
the Korean island of Cheju” took place.170  Territorial and resource disputes are mainly 
maritime in nature, and resolutions to these issues could also be agreed upon through a 
cooperative context.  In addition, recent fisheries accords show the potential for 
cooperation between the two countries. 
Establishing a cooperative framework between the United States, Japan, and 
South Korea initially and then expanding it to include other countries in Northeast Asia 
would stabilize the region.  The precedent for multilateral cooperation has been set 
through the successful bilateral agreements between Japan and the United States and 
between South Korea and the United States.  Each country has over fifty years experience 
working with one another.   
The Korea-U.S.-Japan triangle, “if intelligently and sensitively fostered, could 
play a key role in coping with many of the most dangerous conceivable contingencies in 
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the North Pacific.”171  Under the framework of a cooperative security arrangement, a 
balance of power will be maintained in the region.  This balance of power naturally 
extends to involve all of the powers in Northeast Asia. 
Regional fears--for example, in China--that the United States and Japan may 
intervene to help Taiwan control the Taiwanese Strait or that Taiwan may be included in 
the U.S.-led Theater Missile Defense (TMD) project for Northeast Asia, can be reduced 
through cooperative measures.172  China’s likely main concerns focus on avoiding 
conflict and maintaining its influence in the area.  By maintaining a balance of power 
through a cooperative atmosphere, these concerns can be alleviated.   
D. PRC 
China and the Korean peninsula have a long history.  China is using its historical 
relationship as a premise for its current policies towards the two Koreas and its 
involvement in the unification process.  Currently, China is attempting to balance its 
relationship between the Koreas.  It is “maintaining strong economic ties and improving 
political and military relations with the South, on the one hand, and giving monetary aid 
and holding onto the traditional alliance with the North on the other.”173  South Korea 
readily accepts this relationship in an effort to work towards reconciliation with the 
North.   
China’s previously pro-North position has shifted significantly towards the South 
since normalizing relations in 1992.  China’s relationship with North Korea is a concern 
for the South, but there are several opportunities that exist between South Korea and 
China.  In an attempt to increase military ties, in August 1999 the ROK defense minister 
went to the PRC, and in January 2000, the PRC defense ministers visited the ROK.  174 
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Some analysts argue that “China will become a major world power, but will retain 
a regional focus.”175  Current modernization programs are shifting the traditional strategy 
of quantity to one focused on quality.  A move towards a technologically advanced quick 
strike force is the present aim.  These forces will enable China to easily safeguard its 
regional interests.   
South Korean and Japanese leaders fear the rapid military growth that is taking 
place in China.  “The potential Chinese military expansion and the increasing threat that a 
growing [naval] power projection capability might pose to the surrounding countries in 
Northeast Asia could be a real concern by the next century.”176  Anxieties exist within 
the region over an impending naval arms race.   
Looking to avoid a major arms race, the U.S. goal for the indefinite future will be 
to maintain a balance of power in the region.  As military forces in the region increase in 
size and lethality, “it is more urgent than ever before to establish multilateral regimes to 
discipline the unchecked arms race.”177  Through a cooperative security arrangement, the 
United States can continue to act to prevent rival powers from developing in the area.   
Modernization efforts are rapidly improving Chinese naval capabilities.  
“Although the navy is still essentially a coastal fleet, its maritime strategy is transforming 
from a coastal defense force into an offshore fleet capable of defending China’s ocean 
approaches.”178  Chinese leaders have shown they are opposed to naval arms control 
measures that could limit China’s capabilities.  Through the use of a cooperative security 
framework, the United States and other principal actors in the region can progress beyond 
economic engagement policies with China and begin to address strategic factors that 
could lead to the prevention of conflicts. 
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The United States and China have mutual concerns about each other’s role in the 
Asia-Pacific.  In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the ambiguous statement 
that, “the possibility exists that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will 
emerge in the region,” alludes to U.S. apprehension about Chinese objectives.179  China 
not only fears the U.S. role in Northeast Asia, but it is also skeptical about U.S. ambitions 
with respect to South Korea and Japan.  “China is wary of Japan’s joint endeavors with 
the United States because of their threat to the balance of power in Northeast Asia.”180   
The United States must be cautious about Chinese apprehension and the 
ramifications that they may create.  The uncertainty surrounding a missile defense system 
is one example.  While Japan understands U.S. objectives and interests in developing a 
missile defense capability in Northeast Asia, it has not approved the deployment of such 
a system.  Conversely, South Korean and Chinese ties have strengthened due to the 
ROK’s intent not to participate in a U.S.-led missile defense program. 
One alternative to alleviate some of this insecurity could focus on building a 
cooperative security structure that begins with Japan and South Korea and eventually 
expands to include China.  Security would be enhanced through the stability that could 
result.  “Unless patterns of security cooperation and combined military activity are 
established and nourished, there is a danger of unilateral and bilateral actions raising  
tensions and rivalries in the region, which could risk conflict and inhibit peaceful 
development.”181 
Cooperative naval security missions should be humanitarian not military in nature 
in the beginning, thus having potential to help China.  China may be concerned initially 
for several reasons.  Three significant issues include the following: 
• A U.S. dominated international security-related arrangement may interfere 
with China’s aspirations to become the dominant power in the region.   
• Cooperation might interfere with China’s ability to recover Taiwan or 
defend its coastline.   
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• China is opposed to any military cooperation that enhances the military 
power of other regional states.182   
Each concern must be addressed to lessen Chinese fears.  One way to approach 
these problems is to establish an open relationship and plan for the eventual inclusion of 
China in the cooperative security structure.   
China is an active player in the Korean reunification process and seeks peaceful 
unification through dialogue and negotiations.  By balancing its ties with North and South 
Korea, China hopes to help shape the reconciliation process and prevent an outcome that 
makes the United States dominate.  Following unification, China desires to avoid having 
a significant U.S. presence on the Korean peninsula at its border. 
The recent relaxation between Chinese and Russian leaders, largely due to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, has had a positive effect on Sino-Russian relations.  
Strategic relations between Beijing and Moscow are focusing on strengthening 
cooperation through broad common interests.  Arms sales and the transfer of military 
technology are examples of some of the basis on which this relationship prospers.  
E. RUSSIA 
The Soviet Union and South Korea normalized relations in 1990.  These 
diplomatic ties established the foundation for the strong relationship that exists today.  
Strong links grew through the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and by 
September 1995 Moscow annulled its 1961 friendship treaty with Pyongyang.  Today, 
hoping to act as a balancing force between powers in the region, Russia is looking to 
revive its “past glories via new military diplomacy, with a special eye on Northeast 
Asia.”183   
While Russia has historically been, and continues to be, primarily focused on 
European security issues, it is naturally concerned with stability in Northeast Asia due to 
its proximity to each of the major actors in the region.  Russian interest in the Asia-
Pacific area focuses substantially on perceived economic opportunities.  Russian leaders 
see strengthened trade possibilities through rail and pipeline development that could open 
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markets and grant access to sea lines of communication in Northeast Asia.  Abundant raw 
materials in Russia provide exceptional potential for use in Japanese and Korean 
industries.   
Extensive Russian debt has significantly influenced its relationship with South 
Korea.  Due to economic necessity, South Korea has been faced with seeking repayment 
through military hardware and technology transfers.  This trade has been so substantial 
that “by the end of the 1990s, Moscow emerged as Seoul’s second most important 
military partner after Washington.”184 
U.S. objections to Russian-ROK arms sales are based on two main issues.  First is 
the lack of interoperability between Russian and U.S. weapons.  Second are concerns 
about reliability to continue supplying weapons in the future.  Despite these concerns, 
South Korean officials see the situation as an opportunity not only to receive payment on 
the debt but also to gain knowledge about the capabilities of North Korea, since it 
predominantly possesses Russian made equipment.  In addition, “unlike other suppliers 
of high-tech weapons Russia is willing to transfer ‘core’ technologies and 
components.”185  With this knowledge base, South Korea gains the capability to develop 
advanced weapon systems.   
Similar to other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, Russia is also transforming 
its forces.  Currently, “massive efforts to modernize the Navy are under way to reverse 
the trend of deterioration over the past ten years.”186  Funding for these improvements is 
largely derived from arms exports.  Russia exports military products not only to South 
Korea, but also to China.  Chinese-Russian arms transactions are of great concern to other 
states due to the potential effects on the balance of power in the region.   
The collapse of the Soviet Union significantly altered the balance of power 
structure in Northeast Asia.  Serious economic issues and internal instability have 
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changed the security objectives of the Russian Federation.  Long-term maritime security 
objectives center around remaining involved in regional security with minimal costs.  
Through a cooperative security arrangement this goal can be realized. 
There is already a limited foundation for cooperation between South Korea and 
Russia.  In 1994, an “Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea beyond Territorial 
Waters” was drafted and its implementation is currently being discussed.  Korean naval 
officials announced in April 2002 that “South Korea and Russia will hold their first joint 
maritime search and rescue drill later this year in a sign of growing military cooperation 
between the two nations.”187  In addition, personnel exchanges and meetings between 
military officials continue to become more frequent.   
Through military dialogue and peaceful exercises, confidence is built between the 
participants.  “If the armed forces of the region tailored military capabilities and 
conducted exercises in ways that increased transparency and warning times, raised 
thresholds for military action, and supported peaceful solutions over time” regional 
security would be enhanced.188  A cooperative security structure could achieve this 
objective.   
Russia is interested in the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula.  Its 
interest in this process is evident through its attempts to act as an “honest broker” 
between the two Koreas.  Its involvement in potential expanded six-party talks--which 
would include the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, North Korea, and Russia--
also stresses Russian interest in maintaining a role in the outcome.  North Korea’s debt 
towards Russia is a significant factor for Russian interest in the unification process.  The 
peaceful reunification of the peninsula is important to ensuring a united Korea will 
assume this debt.   
F. SUMMARY 
Several common themes emerge when assessing U.S. regional concerns and 
opportunities for cooperation in Northeast Asia.  U.S.-ROK concerns focus on ensuring 
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stability in the region for the indefinite future.  This stability has historically been a 
product of successful bilateral security alliances with Japan and South Korea.  As the 
unification process on the Korean peninsula progresses it is likely that the maritime 
component of the U.S.-ROK alliance will play a greater role.   
Through a naval cooperative security framework, the United States can maintain 
its presence and strengthen its ties with its current allies and friends in the region.  Each 
country in Northeast Asia would benefit from this arrangement.  As the DPRK continues 
to reform its economy and open itself to the international community, its role in a 
cooperative security organization will ease tensions in the area.  Two significant concerns 
between the ROK and Japan center on Japanese interpretations of history and the effect a 
strong unified Korean economy could have on a troubled Japanese economy.  Previous 
joint humanitarian maritime operations are a starting point for developing a cooperative 
security framework.   
Chinese and Russian common economic and military interests affect all of the 
regional powers in Northeast Asia.  It is important to plan for the eventual inclusion of 
China and Russia in a cooperative security framework.  A security agreement working to 
prevent conflict versus one that prepares for conflict would benefit all of the actors in the 



























VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. REVIEW OF US AND ROK STRATEGIES 
The United States historically has had a strong maritime tradition in the Asia-
Pacific.  Developing in stages since the founding of the United States, the relationship 
between the United States and countries in the Asia-Pacific region has seen periods of 
territorial expansion, conflict, containment, and engagement.  The U.S. Navy Pacific 
Fleet’s involvement in the region has focused on maintaining stability through a balance 
of power to foster economic growth.   
The immense size of and cultural differences within the Asia-Pacific region cause 
U.S. interests to span a wide spectrum of issues.  Supporting policies in Northeast Asia 
which ensure security, honor commitments between allies and friends, and contribute to 
economic growth are the focus of U.S. national interests in the region. 
The U.S. strategy supports these interests by assuring allies and friends, 
dissuading adversaries, deterring aggression and coercion, and when necessary decisively 
defeating opponents.  The strategy of engagement provides the United States the ability 
to create a foundation of security that allows for economic growth.  The United States 
counters regional threats through reinforcing U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan, 
maintaining a U.S. forward based presence, and developing multilateral regional 
institutions. 
The peoples that inhabited the Korean peninsula have historically had mixed 
maritime successes.  While vulnerable to water invasion from the three sides of the 
peninsula, the early inhabitants of Korea focused their fortifications more heavily on the 
threat of land invaders from the north.  Admiral Yi Sun-shin, the great figure of Korean 
naval history, repelled the Japanese invasions of the peninsula in the 1590’s due to his 
invention of the first iron-clad warship.   
Korea was able to remain isolated from the outside world until the late nineteenth 
century.  Foreign intervention and armed conflict resulted in Japanese dominance over 
the peninsula which lasted from its annexation in 1910 through the end of WWII.  
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Following World War II, the fight to gain influence and power over the Korean peninsula 
erupted in the Korean War.  Since the signing of the armistice in Korea, the ROK Navy 
has focused primarily on coastal defense capabilities.  The ROK Navy has predominantly 
designed its naval force structure to complement the ROK Army and U.S. forces in 
defense against the North.  Naval clashes in the Yellow (West) Sea in June 1999 and 
again in June 2002 demonstrate the necessity for this capability.  As Korea looks towards 
the future, this strategy is changing as it redirects its outlook to a more regional security 
focus. 
South Korea, as a modern member of the Northeast Asian community, finds itself 
in a maritime environment that is rapidly changing.  Shifting beyond a coastal to a 
regional mindset, South Korean interests are changing from an inward defensive focus to 
one which incorporates global economic opportunities.  South Korea’s changing interests 
and the recognition of the importance of sea lines of communication for trade and 
security purposes have increased the need for naval capabilities.   
South Korea is developing its role as a regional power.  The ROK Navy is rapidly 
expanding and becoming increasingly sophisticated.  Through modernization programs 
focusing on its destroyer and submarine fleets, South Korea is becoming a well-balanced, 
blue water naval force. 
B. POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS 
One possible future scenario for the Korean peninsula is all-out war.  This 
scenario is highly unlikely because, “North Korea today is not in a political or economic 
position to rationally initiate war against the south.”189  North Korea does not possess the 
food, ammunition, or fuel to last beyond the initial attack. These problems will continue 
to grow over time, but the U.S.-ROK alliance must be prepared for possible irrational 
behavior from the DPRK.  Former Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, 
Admiral Dennis C. Blair, stated in October 2001, that “If North Korea attacks, they will 
have started the last Korean War.”190  The strength of the U.S. and the ROK forces in 
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place to defend the peninsula will most likely act as a strong enough deterrent to prevent 
the North from invading the South again.   
At the other end of the scale is the possibility of an economic or political collapse 
in the DPRK.  An implosion of this magnitude could create a mass refugee exodus 
towards South Korea and China.  The chaos and disorder that would likely ensue would 
create a very weak unified Korea.  The financial burden that is likely to follow from this 
scenario would have severe ramifications on the stability of Northeast Asia.  Further 
problems, in this scenario, revolve around the possibilities that China may move to 
support the North to prevent a dominant U.S. presence on the peninsula.  This scenario is 
one that Seoul and Washington should continue to work to avoid.   
The most likely scenario is for continued gradual unification to occur.  In a four 
plus two context, involving the U.S., the ROK, Japan, China, the DPRK, and Russia, 
each power and its interests in Northeast Asia are represented.  To ensure maintained 
stability, “a gradual process of unification in which neither side is swallowed up by the 
other and the United States helps North Korea to achieve a China-style economy” in the 
best interest of the United States.191  The United States must approach Chinese 
intervention cautiously to avoid a unified outcome that is guided dominantly by its 
interests.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is in everyone’s best interest for the United States to remain forward deployed 
in Northeast Asia.  Even as relations between North and South Korea improve, the United 
States must convey the importance of its balancing role in the region.  Losing the 
strategic location of bases in Northeast Asia would critically damage the balance of 
power in the region.  Alternative bases in Australia are too geographically separated from 
the area, and alternatives in Singapore or Guam, while also geographically separated, 
leave few options for expansion due to their size. 
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“The United States is viewed by countries throughout the Asia and Pacific region 
as the stabilizing factor in what they all consider to be a very uncertain area.”192  The 
ability of the United States to remain in East Asia and provide security for the region is 
critical to the stability of the volatile region.  “The capability and presence of U.S. forces, 
especially naval forces, is the cornerstone of this security.”193  Through a cooperative 
security framework tensions can be reduced among the major actors in the region and 
increased economic growth can be realized through the stability that it could provide. 
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